ABSTRACT Smart cities and E-governance in smart cities has been the emerging topic in this twenty-first century. The rapid developments and experiences in advancing and utilizing the applications of smart city for the continuous smart E-governance have evolved as an interesting topic to concentrate. According to Information and Communication Technology (ICT), the aims and paradigm of the smart city are to provide an integrated infrastructure and manage proper E-governance with a mission of next-generation cities. The smart delivery services which are opting the ICT-based E-governance are facilitated with an interactivity, say Internet through which the citizens can enjoy the best facilities of smart city. As the growing popularity of smart city and its applications, the communication between the government and the citizens is also raising the possibility of infringement attempts. To address this issue, we come up with an advanced multi-factor user authentication scheme which can be utilized for the smart E-governance applications in smart cities. The lightweight nature of our scheme and resistance to many network attacks, including low computational overhead show beyond doubt that our scheme is efficient and applicable to E-governance applications in smart city. A formal verification performed using AVISPA tool confirms the security of the proposed scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
The delivery of information and government services over the internet by means of electronic system is defined as electronic governance or E-governance system. This type of providing the service to the information is also be pertained as information technology (IT). Using the IT, the data can be disseminated to the public and other agencies with an efficiency, faster facilities to perform the government administration with good governance. It is observed that facilities and advantages of E-governance is beyond the scope of e-government. E-governance is not just about the government websites and e-mail services. The utility of E-governance helps in bringing the change as ''how the citizens connect to governments in a way to relate themselves to each other''. This adaptation of E-governance gives freedom to develop the new concept such as citizenship, in terms of needs and responsibilities. This E-governance gives an ample advantage to the citizens to understand the government policies and participate in the governments policy-making by communicating with each other.
In the smart city E-governance, Internet of Things is also playing a vital role in providing a better services to the citizens in utilizing ICT features. Information and communication technologies can play a central role in sharing the data to millions of small devices over the Internet. This brings the security concerns in communications and information exchange.
Despite the term Smart City is very common in everyday speaking, its exact definition is still not well-established [13] . In literature, some interesting definitions can be found, as:
• ''A city connecting the physical infrastructure, the ICT infrastructure, the social infrastructure, and the business infrastructure to leverage the collective intelligence of the city'' [17] .
• ''A city that invests in human and social capital and traditional and modern (ICT) communication infrastructure in order to sustain the economic growth and a high quality of life, with a wise management of natural resources, through participatory governance'' [8] .
• ''A city whose community has learned to learn, adapt and innovate. People need to be able to use the technology in order to benefit from it'' [14] .
• ''A city that reflects a particular idea of local community, one where city governments, enterprises and residents use ICTs to reinvent and reinforce the community's role in the new service economy, create jobs locally and improve the quality of community life'' [4] .
II. SECURITY RISKS IN E-GOVERNANCE
The effective E-governance is the important aspect in governing the smartcity. ICT is one the facilitator for the development of effective E-governance. One of the applications of ICT is E-governance which involve in delivering public services, transmitting the information over exchanging the transactions. The utility services which ICT provides can be featured as government-to-business (G2B), governmentto-customer (G2C), and government-to-government (G2G). Furthermore, ICT can also interact within the framework of government. Figure 1 shows common risks in E-governance. Enriching the information security is an important and crucial aspect which is causing obstructions in effective implementation of E-governance. Information transmitted must be secured from unauthorized access for effective implementation of E-governance.
FIGURE 1. Risks in E-governance.
In getting access to the government services an attacker may breach the security check as follows:
• An attacker may create fake identities to fool the E-governance system and gain access. And once the attacker can breach the security, he/she can easily misuse the services of the server as per their desire.
• An attacker may keep the E-governance system busy and make the services unavailable to the real users by delaying or terminating the services of a host connected to the internet.
• As described by Doley and Yao method [16] , an attacker can capture the transmitted messages and insert, delete, modify or resend the messages. Also, attacker can eavesdrop on the transmitted messages between the parties over the public channel.
III. RELATED WORK
In the process of tackling the attacks and security threats, in the recent years many proposals and approaches [13] , [18] , [23] , [31] - [33] for E-governance has been seen. In the literature, there were schemes related to different remote user authentication proposals using the smartcards were suggested. Very recently in 2015, Srinivas et al. [19] in his work in the design of multi-server environment able to find Shunmuganathan et al. [39] scheme which has many vulnerabilities to replay attack, impersonation attack, forward secrecy attack and smart card attack. Kalra and Sood [22] in his proposal which deals with the cloud servers and Internet of Things(IoT) have come up with a secure authentication scheme which involving Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). But the main problem with the design is the message size which is employed during the communication is significantly increased. However, due to the provision of producing secure mutual authentication and also issues in establishing the valid session key their scheme considered insecure. In 2016, Sharma and Kalra [35] , [38] come up with a proposal regarding the authentication schemes by employing quantum identity to ensure the authenticity of the user to the cloud server. To overcome the password guessing attack, many authors employ biometrics as a factor to involve in the login credentials. In developing a strong user authentication scheme one can use a scalable factor such as biometric which cannot be guessed and also possess an uniqueness property. Wazid et al. [46] proposed a scheme to overcome the weaknesses of the existing schemes in the literature and claims their scheme supports the functionality features (see Table. 5).
In 2017, Moon et al. [29] designed a remote user authentication scheme to ensure the data security. Their scheme too uses the widely considered smart card which can be adopted as it has low computational cost and expedient portability. Sharma et al. [36] proposed a protocol which has the lightweight computations and, they claim it is a robust remote UAKA protocol for e-governance applications which can be utilized in the smart cities environment. As the E-governance has become an essential phenomenon for the smarter way of doing administration by the smart-city authority. As the transmission of sensitive and private information between the government and the user(citizen) over the internet, technically the E-governance need to improvise the information security.
In 2018, for the E-governance applications in the environment related to smart cities, Sharma et al. [37] presented a novel remote user scheme. Though their scheme is designed with lightweight parameters to ensure lowcomputational overhead, their scheme has the possibility to improvise to transmit the low bandwidth and reduce the computation time during the login and authentication phases. Ali and Pal [3] proposed an efficient three-factor-based authentication scheme for the multi-server environment which uses elliptic curve cryptography techniques. But, the problem with their scheme is high computation cost in comparison to the lightweight techniques applied by Moon et al. [29] and Sharma et al. [36] , [37] . Thus, we focus on designing a lightweight user authentication scheme which can ensure the low computation cost and also successfully ensures the security features as mentioned in Table. 5.
A. CONTRIBUTIONS
The major contributions of this work are listed as follows:
• In the E-governance (C2G) environment, to ensure the secure transactions among the participants, we propose a novel design to authenticate the user efficiently by issuing smartcard to the registered users.
• Our scheme is lightweight in terms of computations involved and suits the E-governance environment.
• Using ROR model, an analysis using formal security method is done which ensures that the security attacks arose by an attacker is well taken care by our scheme.
• Also, in continuation to the formal security analysis, we have presented BAN-Logic model which ensures in taking care of the freshness of the current communicated messages and also ensures the validity of the session key.
• Using a world-wide accepted formal verification tool such as AVISPA simulation tool is applied to our scheme to ensure about the interception attacks such as man-inthe middle attack and replay attack. To strengthen the security analysis on our proposed scheme an informal security analysis is carried out to overcome other uncovered attacks.
• Finally, our proposed protocol takes shape as a well defined and comparable to show its performance while comparing with the other related schemes is demonstrated to prove the novality and efficiency.
IV. MATHEMATICAL PRELIMINARIES
A. BIOHASHING ''Hash key'' is a seed representation of the input from the biometric feature set. The function of this BioHashing technique is to generate a vector of bits [20] , [42] . Therefore, the job of this procedure is to diminish the scope and probability of denial of access while ensuring the false acceptance performance. To be more precise, the uniformly distributed pseudo-random numbers are generated with the help of the secret seed which was inputed as the biometric vector data x ∈ R n is foreshortened to a bit vector b ∈ {0, 1} l with the length of the bit string as l such that (l ≤ n) through BioHashing.
B. NOTATIONS AND RULES OF BAN LOGIC
It is considered to use BAN logic [7] to validate the correctness of a well designed AKA protocol. In this method of BAN logic the participants involved in the communications under go the verification process so that the transmitted messages need to be validated to check the interception attack. So, here the transmitted messages from a legitimate user U i and an opted cloud server CS j commit on freshly established shared session key which the both parties can possess. This process takes place during the execution of the protocol and hence the validation of the participants are done on the fly. For the readily use and understanding we provide Table. 1 which possess the notations utilized in defining and presenting the BAN logic. We present the rules of BAN-Logic in Table. 2, in order to present the logical posits in the formal terms [7] , [43] :
As shown in the Figure 2 , the proposed protocol considers multi-cloud-server environment as the network model where the participants in this model would be the users U i , the registration center RC, and the cloud servers CS j as the involved entities. In this model, the RC is considered as a trusted authority and provides the system parameters to the participants during the registration phase. The registered users receives a valid smart card accumulated with some parameters as confidential values needed to login into the system and contact the registered cloud-server to avail the services. Also the cloud-servers are loaded with a secret value VOLUME 7, 2019 which is specific to the CS j . U i and CS j authenticate each other by proving the legitimacy of each other and then without the involvement or assistance of RC both the entities establish a secret session key. Using this session key U i can access the desired services from CS j .
D. ADVERSARY/THREAT MODEL
This section deals with the necessary characteristics and assumptions, including the attacker's capabilities in E-governance environment.
(1) The participants do their entire communication over the insecure channel, an attacker possess the capability to intercept or modify any messages that are transmitted among the parties over public channel [11] , [43] . (2) The transmitted messages can be eavesdropped by an attacker [12] , [26] . (3) By applying the power consumption analysis on the captured smartcards, an attacker can extract the valuable information stored on the smartcard [24] , [28] , [42] . (4) In the network, the registration authority is considered to be secure, however due to the hostile environment the deployed servers can be physically captured by an attacker [15] . (5) Using an off-line manner, an attacker can guess the lowentropy passwords and identities used by an registered user [19] , [27] .
V. PROPOSED SCHEME
We have come up with a scheme which presents its novality in related to applications of smart cities based on E-governance where the remote user can access the resources. Also, we have made use of lightweight parameters to specifically ensure the low-computational overhead, during the execution of login phase, and session key establishment during authentication phases. In our scheme, the recipients and CS j 's undergo the registration process with the Cloud Service Provider (CSP) in order to avail the access of any desired information from the opted cloud server. The necessary system parameters are generated by CSP. s is the master secret key used by CSP and makes the hash functions such as h(·) and H (·) as publicly used parameters.
In many recent proposals, people make user of the current system timestamps. Therefore, we too have applied the timestamps concept in our proposed scheme to handle the replay attack vulnerability. Therefore, all the participants in the architecture of the network model (e.g., users, CSP, and CS j ) need to avail the clock-synchronization feature. In a way, this assumption is considered to be practical and much widely-considered in many designs which are recently proposed [9] , [34] , [40] , [41] . In Table. 3, we have listed all the possible notations and their descriptions used throughout the paper.
The proposed scheme is mainly partitioned into five phases: In our scheme, this whole process encounters in off-line mode. During this process, a genuine user produces his registration parameters over the secure channel to the registration center (RC) which is considered to be trusted. Thus, the communication encounters is assumed to be secure during this phase. Furthermore, looking into the practical scenarios, any registered genuine user before getting the credentials, first submits the required credential details physically, and a successful registration of the user happens only after the verification of the produced details. This phase undergoes two sub-phases namely, (i) cloud server registration, and (ii) user registration.
1) CLOUD SERVER (CS j ) REGISTRATION
The following steps are performed by RC in the off-line mode:
C1: CS j being the current cloud server chooses identity ID CS j which is expected to be unique. As mentioned CS j communicates using the secure channel to send the request to RC for the registration as follows:
C2: Once the request for registration is received, for the unique h(s ID CS j ) RC checks in Rec CS . If the server is new, RC computes C j = h(ID CD j s) and sends it to CS j using IKEV 2 .
and further stores h(s ID CS j ) in Rec CS for future verifications. C3: On receiving the response, CS j keeps C j as secret. 
2) USER REGISTRATION
The following steps are executed by RC for each user U i using off-line mode :
Step 1: A user U i chooses an identity ID i , password PW i and also imprints BIO i and generates a random number r i , and computes
Then, sends a request as
Step 2: RC checks for the uniqueness of the user in Rec U as h(s ID i ). For new user, RC computes as
Then RC sends the smartcard (SC i ) to the U i over the secure channel as
Step 3: On receiving the response, the user undergoes the following computations:
Stores Z i , L i and replaces A i with B i on the smart card. Finally, the smart card contains:
B. LOGIN AND AUTHENTICATION PHASE
Here, the recipient make use of his/her login credentials to access the cloud server by login into the system. The details are discussed as follows:
1) LOGIN
To access the information, the user produces his/her login credentials into the smart card reader such as ID i and PW i also imprint BIO i .
Step 1: The smart card calculates
If the verification is successful, the next steps can be processed.
Step 2: The user generates a random number n 1 , and undergoes the following computations
After the computations, the smart card transmit the message to CS j over the public channel as
2) AUTHENTICATION AND KEY AGREEMENT CS j checks the message with the received timestamp T r once the login request is received to verify the replay/forgery messages.
Step 3: CS j computes
up on the successful validation, proceed with the next steps. Else, terminates the process.
Step 4: A random number n 2 is generated by CS j , which undergoes the following computations
After the computations, CS j transmit the message to user(SC i ) over the public channel as
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Step 5: SC i checks the message with the received timestamp T r to verify the replay/forgery messages upon receiving the response message. Further, undergoes the following computations
Step 6: CS j checks the message with the received timestamp T r to verify the replay/forgery messages.
Once the verification is successful, both U i and CS j make use of the established session key in their future communications. Thus, completes the login and authentication process.
C. PASSWORD AND BIOMETRIC UPDATE PHASE
A registered user U i executes this phase to update/modify his/her current password and biometric key to a new password and new biometric key. Thus, the user undergoes the following procedure:
Step 1: U i chooses ID i , PW i and also imprints BIO i . Then, computes
If the verification is successful, the next steps are executed. Otherwise, terminates the process. 
Step 3:
, respectively. Finally, the smart card contains: 
Step 2: RC checks for the revoked user in Rec U as h(s ID i ). If user exists, RC computes as
Then RC sends the renewed smartcard (SC i ) to the U i over the secure channel as
Step 3: On receiving the response, the user undergoes the following computations: 
Step 
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section deals with the investigation of the security analysis on the proposed scheme by performing the formal and informal security analysis to ensure the security against various known attacks. Recently, in an analysis presented by Wang et al. [45] investigated and presented the following interesting observation. The formal methods (for example, random oracle model) which is widely-applied cannot capture some structural faults. Therefore, considering the security of the authentication protocols is still remains an open issue. Thus, considering the important observation made by Wang et al. we also need to formulate the non-mathematical security analysis which is an informal way to prove the security of the authentication protocol. Furthermore, using AVISPA tool the formal security verification is carried out to show secure with high probability.
A. FORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS USING ROR MODEL
This analysis is carried out based on Abdalla et al.'s [2] proposal, in this method, the formal security analysis validates and proves the security of the session key with the applicability of ROR model which is acceptable and many of the recent authentication protocols made use of this model [10] , [34] , [40] . Prior to proving the session key proof to the Theorem 1, we consider the primitives which are formulated with the ROR model.
Participants: Here, we indicate CI [9] . Accepted state: Let the instance CI l found to be in an acceptance state once it reach the final execution of the protocol message, then we consider it in an accepted state. For each present session, CI l is given a session identification (sid) to construct an ordered concatenation to all its communicated messages during sent & receive.
Partnering: In this part, the partnering of each other for the two instances, namely CI l 1 and CI l 2 exist, if they successfully meet the three requirements: 1) both the instances are considered to be in accepted states, 2) both the instances are considered to be authenticated mutually, and 3) both the instances are mutual partners to each other.
Freshness: CI
is considered to be fresh, if an adversary/attacker A do not possess the session key SK ij by considering the Reveal query.
In this case, we consider that the adversary/attacker A has the full control over the public channel and the communicated messages among the entities. Therefore, A has the potential to intercept, modify, insert or erase the desired messages which are illegally transmitted during the communication by the entities. Furthermore, A undergoes the full access to the following oracles:
Execute(CI ) assure the weak-corruption model as pointed out in [9] , which says that the ephemeral secrets (keys) are not corrupted for the participant instances.
Test(CI l ): In this query, A tries to capture the established semantic security of SK ij between U i and CS j . An unbiased coin c is tossed before the start of the game, the output result is assumed to be known to A and plays a decision point of this query. Furthermore, the session key SK ij remains to be fresh during the execution of this query, CI l outputs SK ij if the case is turnouts to be c = 1 else an arbitrary number is considered for case c = 0. Otherwise, null (⊥) is considered as an output.
Furthermore to this, if all participating entities including the attacker/adversary A will have the complete access to the collision-resistant one-way hash function h(·), where h(·) is modeled as a random oracle, say H (·).
Theorem 1: Assume that, the proposed scheme P runs beyond the polynomial time P rt , then A running in polynomial time P rt and the number of queries for Send, Hash queries, the number of bits in the biometrics key BIO i , the space of h(·) is ranged, the size password which are of a uniformly distributed by dictionary D, are denoted as q s , VOLUME 7, 2019 q h , l, |H (·)|, |D|, and A has the the advantage in breaking the E-governance with in the time P rt is defined as Adv E−gov A (P rt ). Therefore, A's advantage in breaking the SK ij security is esti-
To prove this theorem, we consider the method of proving the proof similar to that which is given in [9] , [40] . In this regard, we undergo our protocol with the five games, say Game j , j = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 are needed. Let Succ Game j be denoted as the success probability of winning the Game j by the attacker A with the guessing of the correct bit c and considering the corresponding advantage probability of A is defined as Adv Game j = Pr[Succ Game j ]. The detailed analysis of each game Game j is described as follows:
Game 0 : In the beginning of the game Game 0 is the actual security experiment run against the proposed scheme P by the A and a challenger C. A picks the bit c at the start of Game 0 . Applying the semantic security definition to our scheme gives
Game 1 : Game 1 is described to be eavesdropping attack. According to this game, 
, and n 2 = M 2 ⊕ K is the session key. A tries to deduce SK ij by making use of temporal secrets n 1 and n 2 , and s which is a long term secret. Since interception of the messages MSG 1 , MSG 2 and MSG 3 cannot be compromised. Therefore, winning the Game 1 does not effect all. Thus,
Game 2 : The difference between Game 2 and Game 1 is that the queries such as Send and Hash are used in Game 2 . In this game, A perfoms active attack and tries to fabricate the messages to convince the participants. The computation of Hash query and verifies the collision with the MSG 1 , MSG 2 and MSG 3 , but due to the random nonces, timestamps, ID i , ID CS j and long-term secret used in these messages. Thus, the Send queries by A is considered with a negligible probability of collision. The application of the birthday paradox is applied to get
Game 3 : The game Game 2 is converted to the game Game 3 by applying the query CorruptSmartcard(CI (C j h(ID i s) T 1 ) , and n 2 = M 2 ⊕K . To deduce SK ij , A have to get the temporal secrets n 1 and n 2 , and long-term secret s.
On the other hands, A has C j which he/she requires s to calculate C j = h (ID CD j s) . i.e., A requires to solve E-gov in at most run time P rt to deduce SK ij . Thus,
Once A undergo all the queries required to win the game, he is left to guess the bit c by applying the Test query.
(32) (27) , (28) and (32) give the following relation:
Applying triangular inequality to the equations (29), (30) and (31), we have:
Finally, (33) and (34) give the required result:
B. SECURITY ANALYSIS USING BAN-LOGIC
Using this formal security analysis with the help of BAN logic, the mutual authentication and session key is defined for the proposed scheme between the participants U i and CS j [30] .
Goals : In presenting the method to make sure about the establishment of session key a well defined goals need to be established. These goals are tested by formulating them as follows [7] :
Before executing, we initially formulate the idealization of the messages which are used in communication during the execution of the proposed scheme between U i and CS j :
Some assumptions need to be formulated based on the proposed scheme such as:
Considering the BAN logic rules and taking the assumptions as described above into consideration, the communicated parties utilize the analysis in proving the mutual authentication and then go for the establishment of the session key as follows:
From the message 1, we can see:
Step 1:
Accounting the Step 1 & assumption A 3 , considering the message meaning rule to derive:
Step 2:
Step 2 & A 1 , the freshness conjuncatenation rule is enforced to acquire:
←→ CS j ). At this stage, the nonce-verification rule is enforced on the Steps 2 and 3 and derive:
Step 4:
←→ CS j ). Considering Step 4, the belief rule is enforced to acquire:
Step 5:
Step 5 & A 4 , jurisdiction rule is enforced to acquire:
Step 6:
From the Message 2, we acquire:
Step 7:
We apply the seeing rule on Step 7, and get:
Step 8:
We utilize the message meaning rule on the Step 8 and A 5 to deduce:
Step 9: The freshness conjuncatenation rule is applied on Step 9 & A 2 , to get:
Step 10:
We apply the nonce-verification rule on the Steps 9 and 10, to deduce:
Step 11:
Considering
Step 11, belief rule is enforced to acquire:
Step 12:
(Goal 2) Considering A 5 and the Step 12, jurisdiction rule is enforced to acquire:
Step 13:
(Goal 1) From the message 3, we infer:
Step 14:
We consider the message meaning rule on Step 14 and assumption A 3 , to deduce:
Step 15:
According to
Step 15 & A 2 , the freshness conjuncatenation rule is applied to get:
Step 16:
The belief rule is applied on Step 16, to obtain:
Step 17:
(Goal 4) Taking the assumption A 4 & Step 17, jurisdiction rule is enforced to acquire:
Step 18:
(Goal 3) In view of the Steps 12, 13, 17, and 18, the mutual authentication and key agreement is established successfully in our proposed scheme by successfully accomplishing the defined goals (Goals 1-4) . Thus, the user U i and targeted cloud server CS j establish session key SK ij = h(n 1 h(ID i s) n 2 C j T 2 ) with each other which is believed to be secure.
C. AVISPA SIMULATION TOOL: FORMAL SECURITY VERIFICATION METHOD
As a part of thorough formal security presentation, we utilize the simulation method which validates the replay attack and VOLUME 7, 2019 man-in-the-middle attack on our proposed scheme. Therefore, [5] As shown in the architecture (Figure 5) , a state-of-artautomatic analysis techniques will be carried out on the backends. As a part of the implementation we consider the role-oriented language which is popularly cognized as High-Level Protocol Specification Language(HLPSL). This HLPSL is in-built with user defined basic roles which are formulated according to the designed scheme and are executed over the network involving all the participants. Furthermore, in this HLPSL few mandatory roles exist such as session roles which are facilitated to enhance the concrete arguments which involves the entities applicable in the basic roles. However, the entire execution of the HLPSL depends on the top-level role which is the environment which can compare the sessions included in the proposed scheme involving the global constants.
The role intruder(specifically denoted as i) acts as legitimate user in the HLPSL. This gives the intruder to participate in the execution as a concrete session while executing the protocol. In [44] , the detail information of AVISPA & HLPSL working validations and specifications. For the clear view of how the basic roles act during the simulation for user U i (see Figure.6 ), RC (see Figure.7 ) and CS j (see Figure.8 ), and also (see Figure.9 ) for the mandatory roles which are implemented specifically for the session, goal and environment is facilitated.
To simulate AVISPA, Security Protocol ANimator (SPAN) [6] , presents the backends such as OFMC and CL-AtSe which are widely-accepted in many recent works. Furthermore, the other two back-ends namely SATMC and TA4SP doesn't support bitwise XOR operation. This shows that SATMC and TA4SP backends results are not conclusive. Thus, we omit the results of SATMC and TA4SP and consider only OFMC and CL-AtSe. Thus, the implementation results are reflected in the Figure. 10 under OFMC as 604 nodes visited with approximated search time 29.96 seconds, and the analysis reaches the depth to 6 plies. From the result, it is clear that our scheme demonstrates safe and secure. Fig.10 insights us and assures the proposed scheme gratifies by securing against the man-in-the-middle attack and replay attack and satisfies the design properties.
D. INFORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section focus on the other security attacks which can be found in the network if any drawbacks exist in the proposed scheme. Well defined scheme should have the potential to restrict such attacks and threats in the network. The details are as follows: [25] U i submits {ID i , NPW i } to RC during the registration phase, where NPW i = H (BIO i PW i ) ⊕ r i . So, the privileged insider at RC does not come to know the password/biometric key of the registered user, A cannot obtain PW i /BIO i from NPW i with the known fact that the collision resistant biohash oneway property, and A cannot guess PW i /BIO i from NPW i with the absence of the knowledge on random strings r i . Therefore, a privileged insider attack is restricted successfully in our proposed scheme.
1) PRIVILEGED-INSIDER ATTACK

2) PRESERVE USER ANONYMITY
Making use of the predefined threat model, we speculate the communicated messages between the parties such as U i and CS j is captured by A respectively. The messages 
This shows the minimum knowledge of IDS i , n 1 and biometric value BIO i is required to breach this attack and derive the user's identity ID i . Therefore, from this discussion we propose that our scheme successfully preserves user anonymity property.
3) PASSWORD/BIOMETRIC GUESSING ATTACK [27] When it comes to the guessing of biometric key, it is computationally infeasible to derive the biometric key from the computed NPW i = h(PW i b α i ) value. Moreover, using the stored parameters of the smart card and the chances of breaking this verification Z i ? = h(ID i A i PW i r i ) in Probabilistic Polynomial Time(PPT) is computationally infeasible task for an attacker. This impresses us that A fails to achieve any advantage regarding the guessing and computation of BIO i and PW i . Therefore, guessing of more than one secret in a single computation is computationally infeasible task. Hence, our scheme resists this attack.
4) USER IMPERSONATE ATTACK
This attack takes place if the attacker captures the transmitted messages such as
, T 2 } and MSG 3 = {M 4 , T 3 }. Now, to frame this attack in the real-time A needs to manipulate MSG 1 . This can only happen if A able to compute
with his credentials or any other parameters to make believe the cloud server CS j as authentic. As A cannot compute < P i , M i , Y i >, without the knowledge of <ID i , BIO i , PW i , r i , n 1 > and secret parameters <s>, this doesn't give any advantage to an attacker to impersonate the user. Therefore, the proposed scheme dissent the user impersonation attack.
5) RESIST THE SERVER CAPTURE ATTACK
As the servers are deployed on the hostile network, it is practical to vision that an attacker can physically capture the cloud server. Though the CS j is captured by A, the parameters stored on the server CS j are different to the other servers when it comes to possess identity ID CS j and secret number s. This shows the masked secret stored on a particular server cannot be the same to any of the deployed servers. Thus even if some server is captured by A doesn't give any advantage to frame the attack. Hence A cannot pretend to be other cloud servers.
6) DENIAL-OF-SERVICE (DoS) ATTACKS [21] It is practical in many ways where the user's smart card can be captured and extract the valuable information by applying the power analysis method. But to frame this attack A need to modify the password/biometric key of the user. If A is successful in updating the password/biometric without the notice of the user can only frame this DoS attack. But, in the update/change phase we observed that to make changes in the registered user's smart card the legitimate credentials such as user identity, password, biometric key are required. From the earlier discussion we already seen that guessing of password/biometric is computationally infeasible for an attacker. Hence, A cannot frame this DoS attack. [27] , [28] This attack can be defended into two cases: 
7) ENSURES MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION
8) RESIST CLOUD SERVER COMPROMISE ATTACK
In proposed scheme, we assume if the cloud server CS j is compromised than one may feel that all the past session keys as well as future keys will be compromised. But, this is not true with our scheme, as attacker can only compromise a cloud server CS j but it is not easily to retrieve the session key. Before computing or retrieving the session key SK ij = h(n 1 CU i n 2 C j T 2 ), the attacker has to get pass the verification h(s ID i ) in Rec U , once this verification holds, then only attacker will be allowed to perform computations such as
. But, though the cloud server is compromised attacker cannot know the long-term secret key s without which attacker cannot compute the above computations and also cannot retrieve the session key and compromise the future sessions. Thus the proposed scheme is secure to perfect secrecy attack. i.e., Attacker cannot compromise the long term secrets. Therefore, the future communications and the session keys are secure. [27] , [28] As discussed above, once the participants authenticates each other, this is due to the acknowledgment of the participants and establish a valid session key SK ij = h(n 1 IDS i n 2 C j T 2 ). Thus, our proposed scheme agree on a session key.
9) SESSION KEY AGREEMENT
10) RESISTANT TO SESSION KEY DISCLOSURE ATTACK
Assume that an adversaryA listens to the ongoing communication and records login message
is secured by the collision-resistant one-way hash function h(·). Secondly, to successfully generate SK ij , A must have the knowledge of the unique session-specific temporary secret h(ID i s) which can only be computed by the cloud server CS j . The parameters ID i and s the secret of CS j are never revealed or transmitted and cannot be extracted by adversary as they are encrypted by one-way hash function h(·).
11) PERFECT FORWARD SECRECY
Firstly, it is clear from our above discussion that A cannot extract SK ij = h(n 1 CU i n 2 C j T 2 ) from the transmitted messages. Secondly, to successfully generate SK ij , A must have the knowledge of the unique session-specific temporary secret h(ID i s) which can only be computed by the cloud server CS j . The parameters ID i and s the secret of CS j are never revealed or transmitted and cannot be extracted by adversary as they are encrypted by one-way hash function h(·). This ensures the fact that A cannot achieve any of the session keys which were established in the past or going to establish in the future. This shows, A cannot compromise the session key. Hence, the scheme is secure to preserve the perfect forward secrecy attack.
VII. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON WITH RELATED SCHEMES
This section deals with the description of the performance of the proposed scheme which is compared among the other relative schemes in terms of security/functionality features, smart card storage cost, communication costs, and computational costs. This performance comparisons is essential to give the best understandability of the proposed scheme. This evaluation gives an insight into the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.
A. SECURITY FEATURES COMPARISON
In Table 5 , deals with the comparison of the security and functionality features which represents that our proposed scheme restricts the attacks from the attacker with much effectiveness and provides the complete security of the system in comparison to other related schemes [3] , [29] , [36] , [37] , [46] . It is worthy noted that in comparison to the existing schemes, our scheme resists various known attacks and also efficiently preserves various security features.
B. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In Table 4 , the time consumed by the cryptographic one-way hash function T h = 0.0023ms and the symmetric encryption/decryption operations T = 0.0046ms were considered. In Table. 6, the time consumption cost while the login and authentication phases and also in Table. 7 the communication sizes between our scheme and other schemes have been compared. We assume that the output of the one-way hash function h(·) is 128 bits, if we use SHA-1 hashing algorithm [1] and symmetric encryption as 256 bits. Further, we assume that each timestamp, random nonce/random number, identity of (U i , RC, CS j )'s is 160 bits in length.
We analyze the detailed results to give a better insight of the performance analysis, as follows: • In comparison to earlier proposed schemes, the proposed scheme consumes much lesser computation cost, such as ≈2.2628ms as discussed in Table 6 . It is very clear from the comparison our scheme results more efficient than [3] , [29] , [36] , [37] , [46] with computation cost ≈29.2121, ≈13.3767, ≈7.7447, ≈2.2743, ≈11.5891 ms. Furthermore, the compared scheme proves to be vulnerable to achieve security requirements as shown in the Table. 5. A graphical representation of the comparison is given in Figure. 11. Thus, our scheme proves to be more reliable due to the security and performance.
• From Table. 7, we were able to illuminate the communication cost consumption of our scheme takes much less than the existing schemes [3] , [29] , [36] , [37] , [46] .
• As shown in Table. 7, we were able to show our scheme and Sharma et al. scheme takes much less storage space than [3] , [29] , [37] , [46] schemes. A graphical representation of the comparison is given in Figure. 12 which gives a greater insight.
• The most considerable and acceptable part is the security. Our scheme draws out the security features and presents the drawbacks of the other compared schemes. Furthermore, our scheme is proven secure based on ROR model, BAN Logic and AVISPA which indeed boost the security strength of our argument. Therefore, Tables 5, 6 and 7, justifies that our scheme is the best among the other five schemes in terms of security, computation cost and communication cost.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In recent years, many applications stores the valuable data on the servers of the government, which were developed of ICT based E-governance. The citizens are allowed to access the data in order to smooth run of the E-governance by availing the applications provided by the government of smartcity. In such situations, user authentication in accessing the data (applications) provided by the government becomes a crucial issue as to avoid unattended access. To address this issue, we have proposed a scheme to facilitate a user whoever wishes to access the data provided by government has to register to the server of the government and avail the credentials required to access. The formal analysis on our proposed scheme is proved based on ROR model. To strengthen our proposed scheme, we have provided informal analysis to ensure the security and functional attributes. Using AVISPA, we conduct the formal security verification and the result proves to be resistant to several active and passive attacks. Furthermore, our scheme proves to be efficient in comparison to the compared schemes. Based on the computation cost comparison, communication and storage bits comparison with the aforementioned schemes.
